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A superselection rule advanced in the course of a quantum-mechanical treatment of 
some phenomenon is an assertion to the effect that the superposition principle of quan­
tum mechanics is to be restricted in the application at hand. Superselection accounts 
of measurement all have in common a decision to represent the indicator states of 
detectors by eigenspaces of superselection operators named in a superselection rule, on 
the grounds that the states in question are states of a so-called classical quantity and 
therefore not subject to quantum interference effects. By this strategy superselectionists 
of measurement expect to dispense with use of projection postulates in treatments of 
measurement. I shall argue that superselection accounts of measurement are self­
contradictory, and that treatments of infinite systems, if they can avoid the contradic­
tion, are not true superselection accounts.
1. Introduction.
We have assumed that every bounded Hermitian operator repre­
sents a measurable quantity. This assumption is acceptable for 
many simple physical systems, but there are systems for which it is 
wrong. (Jordan [14, 89])
In contemporary quantum mechanics we have had to come to terms 
with the proposition that the quantum state of a modeled system, at
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any given moment in time, is a collection o f probability assignments 
to a class o f potential events, or prospects, associated with this system. 
The prospects for each physical system stand to each other in the struc­
ture of an algebra, each node of which signifying that a measurable 
quantity, also called an observable, recognized by the theory as be­
longing to the system being treated, takes on a magnitude lying in a 
specified range. The mathematical representation of the quantum state 
is therefore a function from nodes in an algebra representing those 
prospects to real numbers in the interval [0,1]. Thus rather than saying 
of a system treated by quantum mechanics—as we might say o f a sys­
tem treated by classical physics—that its state representation is a col­
lection of value or magnitude assignments made to its quantities, it is 
better to say that the state representation of quantum mechanics is a 
report on the conditions o f the system’s quantities.
We begin modeling, as Jordan in the above-quoted passage remarks, 
with the hypothesis that every bounded Hermitian operator defined on 
the chosen representation space of functions from magnitudes to in­
tervals, shall stand in a unique representation relation to a single mea­
surable quantity, but quickly discover that this proposal cannot be 
adhered to universally. It can be adhered to, as will be discussed here 
at some length, only on condition that superselection operators do not 
apply in the model being employed. Systems represented in Hilbert 
spaces in connection with which the initial hypothesis holds true are 
called simple. Predication of this simplicity to systems absolutely is 
infelicitous, since by definition the term refers primarily to a relation 
between physical systems and entities serving to model them—a rela­
tion between objects like free spinless particles and certain abstract 
clinics in which they typically receive treatment at the hands o f theo­
reticians. In applying the term ‘simple’ to systems absolutely, we give 
the impression that simplicity is a quality o f systems in themselves. But 
this is misleading. Simplicity, as here defined, is concerned with a re­
lationship between model and system modeled. While I will not urge 
new terminology, nevertheless I will suggest that we should not forget 
this point, as relationships between models and systems modeled are 
at the center of the superselection proposal to treat quantum measure­
ment, and these relationships will thus be the primary focus of this 
essay.
A vast number of nonsimple systems exist. For nonsimple systems, 
the preliminary hypothesis to which Jordan draws attention must be 
restricted as follows: each bounded Hermitian operator that commutes 
with every superselection operator in the model chosen for the system 
stands in a unique representation relation to a single measurable quan­
tity.
Copyright © 1998. All rights reserved.
520 MARIAM THALOS
A superselection operator exists when the space representing it is, in 
the following sense, too rich: there is more structure in the representing 
space than is acknowledged to exist in the physical system being 
treated. Under these conditions a superselection rule is said to operate, 
for the sake of preventing illicit use, by theoreticians, of this excess 
structure. A superselection rule tolerates the existence of excess struc­
ture so long as (1) the theory framed in the model does not make 
representational use of elements which describe no physical situation 
of any kind, and (2) the theory does not make discriminations among 
elements of the model which describe physically identical situations, 
relative to the modeling purposes to which the model is put. Excess 
structure is to be tolerated because it can sometimes be used to advan­
tage, and without violating either of (1) or (2), for representing quan­
tities or states that do not participate in quantum (sometimes called 
interference) effects.
Superselection theories of the process of quantum measurement put 
excess structure to work for the sake of treating interactions between 
measuring and measured within an (otherwise) canonical framework. 
Superselection treatments of measurement, which are intended to re­
place the use of projection postulates, have enjoyed considerable at­
tention since the early 1980s. A cross section of these includes Araki 
[1], Beltrametti and Casinelli [2], Machida and Namiki [16], Bub [8], 
[6], [7], [9], Wan [22]. It is the core principle of superselection ac­
counts—which I hereby designate the superselection policy—that the 
indicator states of detection devices shall be represented by the eigen- 
spaces of superselection operators designated by a superselection rule.
I shall argue that superselection accounts of measurement exploit 
excess structure illegitimately, and in the process become self­
contradictory.
2. Measurement Tensions in Quantum Theory. In the life of any physical 
theory there arises a set of theoretical questions having to do with 
measurement, which may be posed to that theory concerning each 
quantity it recognizes. The characteristic question of this group con­
cerns ideal measurement. Suppose the theory recognizes a quantity Q 
as belonging to a system S, which it portrays as lying in a state w. The 
characteristic question concerning ideal measurement is: Does the the­
ory in question recognize the possibility of an ideal process of measur­
ing Q in the state y/ by a suitable measuring device M? In an ideal 
process, the interaction between S  and M  terminates in a state which 
includes the joint conditions of S  and M, such that the condition of 
some quantity belonging to M —say QM—unambiguously reveals the 
(original) condition of Q in y/ because the magnitudes of this Q lf are
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perfectly correlated with those of Q. Classical mechanics has no general 
difficulties with justifying affirmative answers to questions of this form, 
while quantum theory is plagued by its systematic inability to offer af­
firmative answers. Ironically, measurement o f systems treated by quan­
tum mechanics is ubiquitous in practice, but (apparently) impossible in 
theory. Let us examine a very simple, but nevertheless generic example.
Suppose a system S  is selected, to which belongs a quantity A  whose 
operator representation has a set of eigenvectors which I shall designate 
by {<&|z =  and that the eigenvalues of the operator (also A)
representing this quantity are not multiply degenerate.1 S, let us sup­
pose, has been prepared in a state ^(0) =  2 r cr<pr, with r ranging over 
members o f the index set of the eigenvectors {<£,}. We choose a non­
destructive measurement process,2 in which the measured system S  and 
the measuring device M, initially independent of each other, interact 
for such a time as to form a compound system, then separate again in 
a fashion that afterwards it continues to be sensible to speak o f a final 
state o f S  and a final state of M  as distinct systems. And we perform 
a measurement on S'by apparatus M o f the quantity A, without making 
note of the results.
Then the measurement problem o f  quantum mechanics is constituted 
by tensions among the following:
PI (Comparability): Indicator states of detector M  can be repre­
sented via Hilbert space vectors and operators on them, just as the 
conditions of microquantities are routinely represented. Let A M, 
in a Hilbert space J /M, represent the indicator quantity, and let a0, 
crj, a2, . . . , be its eigenvectors, representing states in which A M 
takes on definite magnitudes, with aQ representing the state o f null 
indication. The initial state of the composite S' +  M  is therefore 
Vo ®  °o (in operator form, P Vo ®  P J .
P2 (Definiteness): Subsequent to a measurement transaction, the com­
posite S  +  A/must lie in a state in which the attribute A Mis, at least 
for a brief interval o f time, value-definite; it must therefore be a mix­
ture o f the form W  =  2,.|c'|2 P9r ®  P„r, with P<fr representing
1. I will follow the convention that Greek characters shall range over mathematical 
representations of quantum states: vectors in a Hilbert space. Each such vector in turn 
represents a function from attributes or prospects to real numbers in the interval [0, 1], 
A capital Roman character shall designate an operator as well as the physical quantity 
the operator is intended to signify; the context will determine which of these is the 
intended denotation for a particular token. The operator P$ shall designate the opera­
tion of projection onto the Hilbert subspace spanned by the vector 4>. I limit attention 
for the purposes of this discussion to operators having eigenvectors and point spectra.
2. To borrow a notion from Beltrametti and Cassinelli [2],
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states of S. (No Hilbert space vector representation of this condition 
is available.)
P3 (Insolubility): There exists no unitary time transformation from 
an initial state represented by a formula Pn  ®  Pco £  J /s ®  J fM, 
into a final state represented by the formula W  of (P2), if minimal 
restrictions on the relations between c and c' are imposed.3
(Pl) is the proposition that the quantities of S and the quantities of 
M, whether these are microscopic or macroscopic, are owed comparable 
treatment. (P2) articulates a certain constraint on what shall count as an 
episode of measurement. Unavoidably it adheres to some, if modest, 
principles of interpreting state functions, as any constraint on what shall 
count as a measurement must give at least a partial interpretation of 
these. (And of course all matters of interpretation are subject to chal­
lenge.) According to a canon of interpretation to which advocates of 
(P2) subscribe—though of course one which is not universally ac­
cepted—neither that state represented by a superposition of the form 2, 
crar nor that represented by 2, ®  or is one in which the magnitude 
of A m is definite.4 But the terminal state of a composite having undergone 
measurement cannot be any state whatever: it must be one in which the 
magnitude o f A M is, without question, definite; for the process to which 
-S falls victim could not otherwise count as a measurement. A measure­
ment, if it is nothing else, is a process at the conclusion of which a de­
tection device registers a definite (and usually stable) reading.
Among (P1)-(P3), (P3) (Insolubility) is inescapable. Its demon­
stration requires assumption of the following, minimal, presumptions:
(a) the terminal state of S’ +  M  shall be representable in the form
2 . |c 'p  P„ ®  Pa, with no restrictions whatever on q>r, but with restric­
tions on c'r and er, that capture certain very minimal conditions which 
justify regarding the process that S  and M  undergo as a measurement 
process;5 and (b) the time transitions countenanced shall be consistent
3. The proposal to look at the possibility of transitions to a final state in which c' #  cr 
and (p #  4>„ for some r, was first considered by Wigner [24], who argued that no 
interaction satisfying very stringent criteria could eventuate in a nontrivial mixture of 
eigenstates for the composite. Subsequent work by A. Fine [12], whose proof was later 
improved by A. Shimony [18], has established generalizations of Wigner’s negative 
results by weakening his proposed criteria. Brown [5] gives an overview of these results. 
H. Stein [19] presents a simpler and more elegant proof of these matters.
4. The convention has come to be known as the eigenstate-eigenvalue principle, accord­
ing to which a quantity Q has a definite magnitude if and only if the system’s state 
representation is a mixture (trivial or not) of eigenvectors of Q.
5. These restrictions are discussed in detail in Stein [19]. These do not assert that in ideal 
measurement the measured system comes to have a definite magnitude of the quantity 
measured on it. This condition has been relaxed for quantum mechanics.
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with the time-dependent Schrodinger equation. It is then shown that 
according to canonical quantum theory, no process satisfying (a),
(b), (PI) and (P2), exists, for the time-dependent Schrodinger equation 
simply does not admit of transformations satisfying (PI), (P2) and 
(a), even if representations of the condition of M  are allowed to range 
over the set o f convex sums of projection operators on (and hence 
to range over all probability states) representable in terms of the ma­
croquantity defined in (PI). Surrender o f either (PI) or (P2) will, of 
course, dissolve the tension. As will surrender of (a) or (b). The mea­
surement problem exists only so long each of the four conditions are 
retained.
The measuring device is wanted in a state of definite indication—at 
all times to be sure, but at the conclusion of measurement processes 
especially; for nothing else is recognized as legitimate by our experi­
ence. The process by which this coming to definiteness takes place is 
sometimes called reduction o f  the wave packet or wave function collapse. 
But canonical quantum theory does not and, to all appearances, cannot 
acknowledge the existence o f any such process. Addition o f an axiom 
called a projection postulate was once intended as an antidote to this 
defect in the theory. A projection postulate is an assertion to the effect 
that the process in question exists. With one stroke a projection pos­
tulate confers on certain unobserved entangled states (ones in which 
the magnitude of a certain quantity of the measuring device is not 
definite, hence states very wwlike W) an equal right to exist, while de­
manding their hasty retreat in favor of the more familiar W. But since 
the problem faced by the quantum theory resides in the lack of consis­
tency among (PI), (P2), (a) and (b), simple addition of postulates can­
not remove the defect.
3. Superselection Rules, and the Modeling of Physical Systems. We say
that a subspace Mreduces a linear operator B if By/ lies in sPf tor every 
vector y/ in J f  and By/ lies in Afc for every vector yj mM~. This condition 
holds just in case for every y/ m.M, P ¥ commutes with B [15, 37]. And 
we say that a Hilbert space M  is invariant (or simple) under a set o f  
(Hermitian) operators S  when ^ reduces every member of S. Then we 
can say that a subspace J f  is invariant under a set of (Hermitian) op­
erators S  when, o f all those operators defined on it, only multiples of 
the identity operator commute with every member of S.6 A nontrivial 
operator that commutes with every self-adjoint operator in an algebra 
of operators is called a superselection operator or super selector, relative
6. By Schur’s Lemma, cf. [14, 67ff j.
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to that algebra of operators. And each such superselector marks a set 
of superselection subspaces, also known as coherent subspaces or 
supersectors.
A simple example will serve to illustrate these definitions. Select a 
coordinate frame for a system S, letting x, y  and z name the three 
spatial dimensions, and let the operator J3 represents the system’s 
z-directed component of angular momentum. J3 is therefore also a rep­
resentation of S’s orientation along the z axis. Consider the operator 
R  — e~,l!'J\  Application of R  will therefore bring about a rotation, 
through an angle of 2n about the z axis, of the orientation of J3. R  may 
thus represent the process of rotating the system S  through an angle 
of 2n. If S  is the only system being treated, then we can also conceive 
of this rotation as a process that leaves S  alone, but rotates the coor­
dinate axes, the orientation of which is selected for convenience’s sake, 
through an angle of — 2n about the original z axis. If we conceive of 
the operation to which R  corresponds in the second way, then we shall 
say that it has no effect on S—for the entity (the coordinate axes) on 
which R  represents an operation is not one that may interact with any 
physical system, S  included. Some would say, in fact, that it is no entity 
of any kind. The two conceptions of the maneuver—the first being that 
R  corresponds to an operation on .S', and the second being that R  cor­
responds to an operation on the coordinate axes—are equivalent, sig­
nificantly enough, so long as our world exhibits a rotational symmetry 
of 2n about the z axis—which it would appear to do. Since the first 
process is equivalent to the second, no measurable quantity in our sys­
tem should be affected by it. Measurable quantities are unaffected by 
human institutions of coordination, the objects they call into existence 
(coordinate axes) or operations thereon. Thus R  represents a process 
only by a stretching of terminology. And operators representing mea­
surable quantities should commute with R , since application of R 
should have no effect on application of operators representing mea­
surable quantities. This condition can be imposed as follows: Let B  be 
a bounded operator representing a measurable quantity. Then
VB  (if B  is a measurable quantity, then ea*j3 Be ",2r:J- = B). (3.1)
R  in this case has eigenvalues 1 and - 1  since (as I shall simply stipu­
late) J3 can take on integer and half odd integer values. Let y/ be a 
vector such that Ry/ = yt, and d> be such that Rd> = — <k cj> and yj are 
thus eigenstates of R, with (cj>, By/) =  (d>, e:2~J-' B e-i2riJ-’y/) — 
(e~aTj3<j>, Be~i27,J}y/) =  -  (4>, By/). And so (<f>, By/) = 0. Hence, if a 
system is such that it may exhibit either integral and half-odd-integral 
eigenvalues of angular momentum, every operator B  that represents a
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measurable quantity on that system will be such that By/ lies in the 
same eigenspace of R as y/. The subspace spanned by y/ is therefore 
invariant: the operation of a measurable quantity B on any object lying 
in the subspace results in a object that lies, once again, in that subspace. 
Once (3.1) is adopted, therefore, a set of invariant subspaces—super­
sectors—emerges.
We can give a physical interpretation of the invariance property for 
a supersector S  as follows: S represents a group of states which have 
in common the magnitude of R, and no measurable quantity can in­
teract with either R, or any other measurable quantity, in such a way 
as to alter the magnitude of R  for a physical system. This formal con­
dition, we might say, corresponds to the fact that states represented in 
different invariant subspaces are prevented by nature from combining 
with each other. R is thus a superselector relative to the algebra of 
measurable quantities exemplified by systems subject to that rule of 
nature.
Superselectors are normally discovered, in relation to function spaces 
already in view, and algebras of operators on them: a superselector is 
identified when an operator is discovered to commute with every op­
erator in a chosen algebra. Another procedure is to bring an algebra 
of measurable quantities to attention, as a distinguished set, through 
specification of superselectors: for example, a von Neumann algebra is 
said to be generated by a specified set S  of projection operators, when 
it includes all and only those operators formed by taking scalar mul­
tiples, sums, products and weak limits (starting with bounded func­
tions) of members of S. Thus one means of restricting membership in 
an operator algebra of measurable quantities is to include only oper­
ators which commute with a designated operator, or set of operators. 
A membership restriction of this form is called a super selection rule. In 
the presence of a superselection rule, an operator B will be admitted 
into a target algebra only if it commutes with every operator named 
by the rule.
There are important effects, on the model being used, of adopting 
a superselection rule, for example the following: in the presence of a 
superselection rule on a spaced, the set of all density operators defined 
on J /  becomes, in a very specific sense, overlarge: there exist sets of 
density operators, such that any two members of the same set, though 
they might have different mathematical properties, will nevertheless 
agree on all probability measure assignments made to the prospects 
associated with physical quantities. This equivalence is of great signif­
icance, since the set of physical quantities for a given system S, which 
I will call /!%, comprises the only quantities whose conditions matter 
from the point of view of modeling S. Superselection rules are, there­
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fore, a gauge of excess model structure. What may be surprising, how­
ever, is the formal relations between operators that represent identical 
probability assignments. An illustration is worth a thousand words.
Consider a unit vector 4>k in a supersector Mk and a second unit 
vector 4>k' in another superselection subspace Mk' such that k #  k '. and 
form the superposition yj — A(f>k + A'<pk’ with |/.p + |/ '|2 = 1. Now let 
D = |/-|2 + |/ '|2 i V  If we then choose a basis for the composite 
Hilbert space J /  of which 4>k and A  are both members, and let P be 
any projection operator reduced by the coherent subspaces, we have: 
T r(P ig  = (<f>k, PPv4>k,) + Mv, P P ^ k)  = W2 (<t>k, P<t>k) + |Af 
PA')-1 But now compare Jr(PD) = (cf>k, P]\X\2PAk + ]<f>k) +
(4>k., m 2p*> + \^'\2^ w )  = i to * ,  p ^ )  + m f a ,  The
traces are equal. Now since every observable in the algebra is re­
duced by the coherent subspaces, every observable will be a linear func­
tion of projectors reduced by the coherent subspaces. Consequently the 
two density operators Pv and D will agree on probability assignments 
for every operator reduced by the coherent subspaces, even though 
other of their mathematical properties differ; Pv and D make the same 
assignments of probability to every prospect in the algebra / l %. Since 
in contemporary quantum mechanics we accept the proposition that a 
state of a system S is nothing more than a collection of probability 
assignments to that special class of prospects associated with the al­
gebra of quantities , we are obliged to accept both Pw and D as 
(perhaps syntactically different) representations of the same state. It 
turns out, in fact, that in Hilbert spaces with superselection rules there 
exist infinitely large equivalence classes of density operators, each mem­
ber of a given class equally suitable for representing the same state.
Despite this excess, it can be shown that in the presence of super­
selection rules there is exactly one operator in each of the equivalence 
classes with the feature that it commutes with every member of the set 
of superselectors, and as a result with every member of . In each 
equivalence class this is the mixture whose parts are projection oper­
ators onto the designated supersectors. (Demonstration of the unique­
ness of the canonical mixture is lightly sketched in Beltrametti and 
Cassinelli [2, Ch. 5].) Beltrametti and Cassinelli [2] designate this the 
canonical mixture associated with the corresponding pure state; I shall 
follow their assignation. Thus whilst the set of physical states does not 
correspond one-to-one with the set of density operators, even so the 
set of physical states corresponds one-to-one with the set of density 
operators that are also members of
The argument that P¥ and D are representations of the same physi­
7. A detailed proof appears in van Fraassen [20, 190].
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cal state, together with demonstration that D is a preferred represen­
tation, provide grounds for the proposition that superpositions of vec­
tors drawn from distinct eigenspaces do not represent new states, but 
instead mixtures—that is to say logical combinations—of eigenstates 
already recognized. No new physical states can be manufactured by 
superposite combination of these eigenstates because nature, as it is 
said, keeps the eigenstates separated. It is this idea—that there are laws 
of nature, expressible in the form of superselection rules, which give 
rise to separated states—that motivates superselection-based treat­
ments of, for example, nuclear processes. In nuclear physics the fun­
damental nucleons (protons and neutrons) are often treated as if they 
were merely different states of the same kind of physical system: the 
so-called nucleon. The circumstances in which such treatment does not 
lead to error are those in which the quantities (for example, charge), 
which would in different circumstances distinguish the behaviors of 
systems to which they belong, are of either little or no consequence in 
the circumstances treated by the proposal, because the electrical forces 
in those circumstances are either nonexistent or negligible in compar­
ison with the strong nuclear forces that dominate; as a result, proton 
and neutron behave identically under these circumstances. Thus there 
need be no treatment of quantities that alter under the exertion of 
electrical forces. In such cases the invention of the nucleon simplifies 
the treatment of the problem. But the simplification is purchased at the 
price of introducing excess structure, the exploitation of which must be 
vigilantly prohibited: a superposition of pure proton and pure neutron 
is not recognized as representing a genuine condition of a nucleon. 
Well-established terminology now has it that a law, expressible via a 
superselection rule and called the law of conservation o f electric charge, 
is at work keeping the nucleon states separated.8 We have an illustra­
tion here, therefore, of how a fact that concerns relations between ob­
jects and mathematical representations can be conceived of as a law of 
nature, and expressed in the form of a superselection rule.
One moral I shall draw at this point is that supersectors are struc­
turally equivalent to each other, in relation to a distinguished algebra 
of operators—an algebra distinguished by our intentions to treat cer­
tain quantities and leave aside others. We may thus treat these super­
sectors as capable of representing exactly the same entities and situa­
tions in the world, each supersector being a perfect duplicate of the 
others, relative to the matters we are interested in treating. Or we may 
permit the use of different supersectors to represent different entities 
or situations at different times—so long as the entities we choose to
8. A  similar case is made for baryonic charge conservation.
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represent are, for the purposes of the treatment, structurally identical— 
simply by inscribing our intentions in the legend of the model, as it 
were. And we shall be permitted to do the latter provided that we do 
not recognize real-time transitions between the fictionally identical 
states: we must refuse to acknowledge transitions to and from these 
fictionally identical states as straightforward descriptions of real-time 
goings-on.
What we may not do, however, is pretend that the legend inscription 
is a part of the model itself. If we elect to represent protons and neutrons 
as different states, identical in mathematical form, of a fictitious observ­
able (nucleon), we cannot claim that there is a piece of structure in our 
model that corresponds to proton and a different piece of structure that 
corresponds to neutron. For the assignment of a specific supersector to 
the neutron can be nothing but a matter of convention, not a matter of 
ensuring that the supersector selected has properties suited to the rep­
resentation of neutron by contrast with proton. If it were not so, our 
pretense of nucleons should otherwise be a sham pretense.
4. Classical Quantities. It must be recognized as a philosophical prin­
ciple of the highest importance that the structures present in our (math­
ematical) models, alone, cannot determine which elements of these 
models may be put to representing realities existing in the world, and 
which may not. Thus the structure of a Hilbert space is not, by itself, 
sufficient for determining which operators defined on it may be engaged 
for representing true-life measurable quantities and which may not. 
Even the most thorough inspection of the mathematical characteristics 
of a simple rotation operator like R (of previous acquaintance in this 
piece) does not reveal that measurable quantities represented by op­
erators on the Hilbert space should not have their operations affected 
by those alterations (in this case rotations) brought about by R; this 
proposition concerns potential relations of representation between ele­
ments of the model and those portions of the world which they are put 
to modelling. In other words, it concerns the potential for modeling 
the world correctly. And thus the matter cannot be judged by inspec­
tion of the model alone; it requires inspection also of the world, either 
in its necessary or its contingent aspects. In the case of R, for example, 
the elements of the model have a particular relationship to the rota­
tional symmetry existing in the world. And the superselection rule re­
quiring measurable quantities to commute with R is a means of ex­
pressing the fact that R represents no procedure that could alter a 
system’s physical condition.
The demands and realities of modelling must be substantively 
treated by every physical theory. And friends of the superselection
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treatment of measurement phenomena take modeling issues especially 
seriously, endeavoring, in their considerations, to accommodate the 
proposition that some systems exhibit so-called classical traits. They 
do not consider this a proposition belonging to logic, but one achieved 
through observation. And they urge that accommodation of this prop­
osition be made in the form of superselection rules. In other words, 
they call on us to acknowledge the truth of the proposition that certain 
measurable quantities are classical, (by hand, so to speak), by intro­
ducing restrictions on those operators recognized as representing mea­
surable quantities.9
If there does indeed exist a class of quantities that do not participate 
in quantum entanglement or interference effects,10 the question arises 
whether a theory treating this class of quantities should not merely 
accommodate the fact, but explain it as well. This is something that 
some (for example, Bub [6] and Wan and Harrison [21]), but not all 
(notably, not [2]), superselectionists have aspired to do. Since, however, 
my objection to superselection accounts of measurement shall simple 
have to do with their accommodation of this fact, I simply pass over 
this question.
Superselectionists have as their primary objective to accommodate 
measurement episodes in a canonical quantum mechanical framework. 
They take this task to be comprised of two parts. In the first, a Hilbert 
space representations of indicator quantities, understood as classical 
quantities, are developed; this is anticipated to take the form of a sti- 
pulative and noncreative definition of the notion classical quantity. In 
the second part of the project, they propose to show that a description 
of the measurement process, conforming to (Pl), (P2), (a) and (b) above, 
may be given in terms of notions defined stipulatively, and that this de­
scription shall draw on no principles external to canonical quantum the­
ory itself—such things as, for example, projection postulates. The aim 
of the superselection program is to vindicate the proposition that ca­
nonical quantum theory requires neither supplementation nor modifi­
9. Superselectionists do not adhere to the proposition that any operator admitted by  
their superselection rules corresponds to a measurable quantity, since they acknowledge 
that there m ay be other considerations, entirely independent o f  their own, that m ay go 
against admission o f  certain operators into algebras o f  measurable quantities. In other 
words, nothing in the superselection treatment forbids further  restrictions on the mem­
bership o f / y j . For superselectionists do not conceive o f  themselves as giving an account 
o f  the notion o f  measurable quantity, so much as treating one type o f  qualification for 
being a measurable quantity.
10. There are those who challenge the proposition that such a class exists: they suggest 
it is not impossible in principle for macroscopic quantities to enter into interference (for 
example, Legett [15]). SQ U ID  experiments are thus being proposed and carried out.
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cation in order to treat measurement interactions. The purpose of a su­
perselection account of measurement is then, ultimately, to show that 
(PI), (P2) and (P3) are not in conflict, and to do this by demonstrating 
that, if we accept canonical quantum mechanics with superselection 
rules, the truth of (P3) shall not keep us from representing the final state 
of systems interacting in a measurement process via W.
There are two standard characterizations of classical quantity in 
general circulation. The first is formulated in terms of the eigenspaces 
of operators employed to represent these quantities. Suppose C is an 
Hilbert space operator corresponding to a classical quantity; and sup­
pose, further, that each of the members of the set {JfcJz = 1,2, . . .} 
are eigenspaces of C. Then according to the first characterization of 
classical quantity, vectors drawn from distinct eigenspaces of C are 
nonsuperposable; in other words, the (nontrivial) superpositions of 
such vectors are not to be reckoned as new states of C. Nature, as the 
proposal has it, does not tolerate nontrivial superpositions of classical 
states as genuine states, for classical states are separated. An immediate 
consequence of this characterization is that classical quantities never 
participate in interference effects.
The second standard characterization of classical quantity is for­
mulated in terms of relations had by them to other quantities. C, on 
this conception, is compatible with all other measurable quantities. 
This condition is, of course, the condition that C commutes with the 
appropriate operators. An immediate consequence of this second con­
ception is that classical quantities are magnitude-definite in every al­
lowed state of a system to which they belong.
I shall, without further comment, adopt the second characterization 
of classical quantity: a measurable quantity is classical, I shall say, 
whose operator representation commutes with all other operators rep­
resenting measurable quantities. It is indeed a routine matter to show 
that, once superselection rules distinguishing an operator C as a su­
perselector have been adopted, it follows that vectors drawn from dis­
tinct eigenspaces of C do not tolerate superposition; separation of the 
states of C is thereby ensured. Demonstration of this is just the proof 
that nontrivial superpositions of vectors from distinct eigenspaces of 
C are strictly equivalent to nontrivial mixtures of these same vectors: 
nontrivial superpositions of this kind are not new states of C because 
nontrivial superpositions assign exactly the same probability measures 
to prospects in the algebra of measurable quantities. But the equiva­
lence of the two characterizations of classical quantity remains to be 
proven, for it has yet to be shown that when vectors drawn from dis­
tinct eigenspaces of C do not tolerate superposition, then C commutes 
with every member of/?*. I shall take this proposition for granted, as
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others have done, although it is not, as far as I am aware, proven 
anywhere. (Nothing I assert in this essay shall rest on this presuppo­
sition, however.)
5. Measurement and Superselection Rules. The objective of superselec­
tion accounts of measurement is to give an account of the behavior, 
over time, of objects like detectors, through adoption of the policy that 
indicator states of detection devices shall be represented by eigenspaces 
(the supersectors) of superselectors. The first item on the superselec­
tionist’s agenda is now complete, for a general account of classical 
quantity has been presented. The second item on the agenda is to em­
ploy this characterization of classical quantity in mounting an account 
of the measurement process, again without adding to canonical quan­
tum theory. The result shall be a theory which, while harmonizing PI, 
P2 and P3 (and thereby differing in empirical content from quantum 
theory without superselection rules) does not diverge from the axioms 
of the theory.
Let J/s and be once again the Hilbert spaces of measured and 
measuring, respectively, with the composite system represented in the 
tensor product space 'S+M = a¥s ®  J/M. We shall stipulate that if 
is an indicator state of M, then the observable P(S,k projects onto a 
superselection subspace Mk of J/M\ nature, we shall say, does not tol­
erate superpositions of states drawn from distinct eigenspaces Mk of 
J/M. Next, we generate the elements of the von Neumann algebra 
d%+M ° f physical quantities of S + M. The elements of /7*+m be 
those Hermitian operators that also commute with all superselectors 
defined for Once w is specified, there will exist a mechanism
for determining equivalence classes of state representations. Selecting 
among the members of each class exactly one distinguished represen­
tation that corresponds to a mixture, the superselectionist proposes to 
produce an argument to the effect that, under certain specified circum­
stances, we can expect some pure states to evolve into mixtures of the 
appropriate form, by evolving into states that are equivalent to these 
mixtures with respect to the measurable quantities.
Since J /M is composed of supersectors, there is some reason to sus­
pect that any Hilbert space in which J/M appears as a subcomponent 
will also be constituted by supersectors, since it too will reflect a partly 
classical structure. L t t ^ s+M, therefore, inherit the superselection sub­
spaces of the component spaces J/s and J /M on which it is constructed, 
for if (for example) J/M comprises supersectors Mk, then any tensor 
product space which features these Mk will also be comprised of super­
sectors, this time of the form: [.] ®  Mk.u For the sake of focusing
11. Superselectionists adopt this rule o f  inheritance with little or no careful argument,
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attention on measurement phenomena, assume that J /s does not itself 
comprise supersectors. So the supersectors with which we will be con­
cerned will be of the iovcn.J/s %Mk. A measurable quantity of a system 
represented in such a space will be represented by operators that com­
mute with each I  Only such operators may be admitted to the 
algebra/?*.^,.
Turning now to the treatment of time evolution in systems with 
classical quantities, consider the case when the initial state of S is an 
eigenstate 4>k of the operator representing the measured quantity. Sup­
pose that S, under the current procedure, terminates in the state \f/%, 
which may depend, not only on the initial state of S but also on the 
kind of instrument M  and its tendency to disturb the states of S,12 and 
that M  terminates in The final state of the composite system will 
then be y/ff (x) This final state lies in a supersector of<=^ ._ w; hence 
we need not replace it by any mixture.
Now consider the case in which y/0 = 2, c,0;. The initial state of
S + M  will be (2, ctd>i) ®  and will evolve, by the Schrodinger equa­
tion, into the state represented by Af  = 2, c,(^f ®  O,)—a vector in 
M with operator representation PA.. But now, s in ce^  w comprises 
supersectors, we cannot be guaranteed that the final state vector cor­
responds to a pure state, since it may not lie in a supersector of the 
composite space. If the final state vector of the composite system does 
not belong to a supersector of the tensor product space, we shall be 
obliged to replace it by the canonical mixture: W = 2,. | s i n c e  
W is the only operator that commutes with every member of the al­
gebra of measurable quantities.
Before application of superselection rules we have the following: 
application of the time development operator to the nontrivial super­
position results in a pure state PAf. But PAf is not a correct descrip­
tion of the final state of S + M; W is the correct description—accord­
ing to (P2). Before adoption of the superselection policy, we have the 
result that PA and W are equivalent, with respect only to any operators 
of the form Os ®  I  and I  ®  0 M, where Os and 0 M are operators defined 
on the respective component spaces alone. This is due to the fact that
suggesting merely that since the ^ s  o f  the measuring device represent classical states, 
then anything o f  the form a  0  must also represent a classical state and therefore 
an eigenstate o f  a classical observable— a superselector. But there is a clear justification 
o f this rule o f inheritance, at least in situations in which the <£>ts are conceived o f as 
images, each o f all the others. In that case anything o f  the form a  ®  <I>; will be trivially 
a copy o f  a  ®
12. For perfectly nondisturbing measurements, replace i//f by 4)t.
13. These states are bona fide  mixtures, though not mixtures susceptible o f  interpretation 
on the ignorance interpretation o f  mixtures. See [13, Ch. 5 and 9] for details.
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PAf and W have the same reduced states (the same images on the com­
ponent Hilbert spaces).13 As a result and W  are equivalent with 
respect to the algebra generated by operators of the form Os (x) /  or
I  ® OiT
There are, however, operators of the form Os (x) 0 M, but not of the 
form Os (x) I  or I  ®  0 M, that represent measurable quantities. With 
respect to these operators, the state representations PA and W  are not 
equivalent, prior to adoption of the superselection policy. Now it is 
not at all the contention of advocates of superselection that all these 
operators are without physical significance. To the contrary: it is their 
contention that, with respect to all the (true) measurable quantities of 
the form Os (x) 0 M, PAf and W  generate identical probability assign­
ments.14 On the basis of equivalences between such states as PAf and 
W, the superselectionist considers the measurement problem dissolved.
6. The Contradiction. By far the most widely acknowledged infirmity 
of superselection accounts of measurement is the following, attributed 
to Hughes [13, § 9.7] and van Fraassen [20, 267]—by each to the other. 
Let Afk be a supersector of J/M. Then J /s (x) Mk is a supersector of the 
tensor product space &#S+M. Consider transformations brought about 
by the unitary operator UT = e~ihm, where H  is the infinitesimal gen­
erator of this weakly continuous one-parameter unitary group of op­
erators. Suppose H  is the Hamiltonian of the system, and represents 
total energy. UT then represents the time evolution operator, and maps 
the initial state designated as A0 into the one designated as Af. In the 
cases of interest the final state Af  is subject to being replaced, in a 
superselection account, by the appropriate mixture W. Since in a large 
number of normal instances A0 G J/s (x) Mk but Af  ^  Jfs (x) Mk, the 
superselection subspaces of ^ S+M do not reduce UT. Hence UT can be 
neither a measurable quantity of such systems, nor a function of one; 
thus H  cannot be a measurable quantity. But according to the super­
selection account, all measurable quantities must be reduced by the 
superselection subspaces of the system. Hence superselectionists must 
admit either: (1) that H, the infinitesimal generator of time evolution, 
does not represent energy, or (2) that energy, represented by H, is not 
a measurable quantity for the systems being treated.
The Hughes-van Fraassen complaint is that the proposal to deny H  
its normal canonical interpretation is conspicuously undermotivated: 
it rejects, without good reason, the canonical practice of modeling time 
evolution around energy considerations. The significance of energy in 
quantum mechanics is due to its appearance in the rule of dynamical
14. A  proof for a simple case is presented in [13, 285-287].
Copyright © 1998. All rights reserved.
534 MARIAM THALOS
transformation, which is, according to Hermann Weyl, the fundamen­
tal axiom of quantum mechanics and is of universal validity [23, 80]. 
Thus the complaint can be put more forcefully: the superselectionist’s 
commitment, either to denying the status of measurable quantity to the 
Hamiltonian or to breaking its association with total energy, necessi­
tates a departure from canonical quantum theory. A routine applica­
tion of canonical quantum theory presumes that a Hamiltonian exists 
and corresponds to energy. For the Schrodinger equation, the sole prin­
ciple of time transition in a theory whose primary subject matter is time 
transformation, describes transition that conforms to a slate of desid­
erata, among them conditions of homogeneity of both space and time. 
A description satisfying these conditions exists only on the assumption 
that a Hamiltonian exists; and a Hamiltonian exists for a system ex­
actly on condition that total energy has a nonchanging magnitude 
throughout the span of time we undertake to describe that system. If 
these conditions are not met, no application of the Schrodinger equa­
tion to an initial state like A0 can be justified. But this application is 
precisely what leads to the problematic final state PA/—a problem 
solved in a superselection theory by replacement of the problematic 
PA with the more congenial W. But if we are not to understand the 
Hamiltonian in the normal way, how are we to justify a routine appli­
cation of the Schrodinger equation to A0?
This is a grave difficulty for superselection accounts. But it is not, 
in principle, an insurmountable one. After all, the proposition that the 
Hamiltonian does not have its usual status is not so bad a thing as a 
contradiction. Although if one alleges that the Hamiltonian is not an 
observable, for example, one then owes an account of what it does 
represent, and why it is important to represent it, and why it plays an 
important role in time development. However to say that some kind 
of explanation is called for, is not to put forward a damning criticism. 
We must recognize, after all, that superselection accounts accommo­
dating measurement interactions are not put forward as complete ac­
counts of the measurement process, but merely as general schemata for 
assembling certain apparatus-oriented restrictions into the form of su­
perselection rules. More must be said, and perhaps more physics of 
instrumentation be offered, before any specific applications of the the­
ory may be approved. Each application of the super selection account 
must ultimately be justified on its own merits.
Nevertheless the Hughes-van Fraassen criticism does well in calling 
the following to attention: the simple and possibly true proposition that 
measuring instruments are never in nontrivial superpositions of distinct 
indicator states is not sufficient justification, strictly speaking, for as­
serting a specific superselection rule. The superselectionist must set out
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reasons for adopting each proposed rule. This necessity moves the su­
perselection project from the theoretician’s armchair ultimately into the 
laboratory. Optimism might survive: the application-specific theories, 
perhaps also instrument-specific, which may be entertained on behalf 
of application of the superselection theory in a particular case might, 
if superselectionists are very fortunate, also provide justification for 
either the conjecture that H  does not represent the total energy for the 
system in the application, or the conjecture that H  in that instance is 
not a measurable quantity despite the fact that it generates time evo­
lution.
Wan [23, 980], acknowledging this problem, draws our attention to 
specialized treatments, in both classical and quantum settings (Dirac’s 
Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity, the Gupta-Bleuler for­
mulation of quantum electrodynamics), in which, as it is said, it is 
inappropriate to regard H  as representing energy. This, however, does 
not help in contexts in which H  is appropriately regarded as repre­
senting energy, which—if canonical quantum theory strictly applies to 
any system whatever—must exist. Wan’s suggestion seems to be that 
we may acknowledge a solution to the measurement problem only in 
the special cases. But if this is right, then the measurement problem is 
not solved: it is merely confined to nonspecial cases. Another group of 
physicists ([4], [3], [10]) have advanced arguments, which bear a family 
resemblance to each other, for the claim that the Hamiltonian of a 
weakly-coupled many-body system, representing as it does total micro­
scopic energy, is not a genuinely measurable quantity in certain con­
texts, and thus cannot be treated alongside certain other quantities— 
at least not in the same way. Common ground in these arguments is 
the assumption that the nature of a many-body system is such that to 
conduct a measurement of its total microscopic energy, in distinction 
from its macroscopic energy, is necessarily to subject the system to a 
process which invariably destroys interactions and correlations be­
tween components of that system. But this procedure constitutes a vi­
olence to the macroscopic system as such; the body as macroscopic body 
cannot survive such a procedure. Hence, despite the fact that micro­
scopic energy is both defined for the system and plays a prominent and 
important role in moving its development forward in time, microscopic 
energy is not genuinely measurable. A superselectionist might adopt 
such an argument, suggesting that quantities satisfying specified con-
15. To sustain this line o f  argument the respondent must argue for a disanalogy between 
m acroscopic bodies and m icroscopic ones. The destruction o f  a m icroscopic body in 
the process o f  a measurement o f  some one o f  its properties does not, after all, imply 
that the property measured by that procedure is in som e way immune to measurement. 
The normal practices o f  microscopic measurement are quite to the contrary o f  such a 
conclusion. It present quite a challenge, therefore, to maintain this position.
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ditions are not genuinely measurable as quantities o f the body as such.15 
This proposal has strong Aristotelian overtones, and might be sup­
posed to rest on the merits of the conception of ‘mixt’ which Pierre 
Duhem put forward early in this century: “Some bodies, the one dif­
ferent from the other, are brought into contact. Gradually they dis­
appear, they cease to exist, and in their place, a new body is formed, 
distinguished by its properties from each of the elements which pro­
duced it by their disappearance. In this mixt, the elements no longer 
have any actual existence. They exist there only potentially, because on 
destruction the mixt can regenerate them.”16
Similarly, Wan and Harrison [21] undertake to explain the nonmea­
surability of the Hamiltonian as follows. They say that certain pro­
cesses involve destructions of certain aspects of systems (for example, 
destructions of superconductivity). “Evolution from one supersector to 
another involves the annihilation of the initial system and the subse­
quent creation of a new one”—not merely ordinary changes of state 
(p. 6). Such a process, they say, cannot be explained by reference to 
internal processes, because the former are not, according to the au­
thors, “self-generated.” They continue: “We argue that the destruction 
of a system cannot be achieved by a self-generated process, but must 
be effected by external factors. So it is understandable that the gener­
ator of the evolution group cannot even represent an observable of the 
system involved, let alone their energy.” According to Wan and Har­
rison, these facts should alleviate widespread unease concerning the 
Hamiltonian’s unusual status in superselection accounts. “Despite 
there being no external interference during the transition between dif­
ferent supersectors, this ‘nonequilibrium process’ cannot be described 
solely in terms of observables of the initial and final equilibrium sys­
tems” (p. 7). This last passage, however, makes matters worse rather 
than better, since in it the authors are admitting that normal conditions 
are met for presupposing that a Hamiltonian exists and represents total 
energy. Why therefore are special pleadings necessary to justify the 
proposition that it does not count as measurable? On the other hand, 
the scare-quoted ‘nonequilibrium process’ suggests that normal dy­
namics are in fact not operative. But if they are not, how are we in 
good conscience to put forward the proposition that canonical quan­
tum mechanics has been saved from the sword by the superselection 
account? Pitfalls spring up wherever the superselectionist treads, and 
apparent inconsistencies. These traps would all be explained if only we 
could find one clear and true contradiction in the theory. This is what 
I propose to reveal.
16. Duhem [II,  12], as translated and discussed by Needham [17].
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I shall, first of all, explain why superselectionists sustain a need to 
deny observable status to the operator H  (whatever, if anything, it 
might signify). If my explanation is correct, there is no room for extra­
armchair activities in an all-things-considered superselection account 
of measurement. In the process we shall come to recognize that super­
selection, as an account of measurement, entails a contradiction. This 
contradiction comes about as a result of an inadmissible exploitation 
of excess model structure. But first: explanation of the nonobservable 
status of H  within a superselection theory of measurement.
In order to provide for alterations over time in magnitudes of clas­
sical quantities, the superselectionist must find means of representing 
time transitions across supersector boundaries, for the sake of repre­
senting transitions in an indicator quantity from a ground state to an­
other state of definite indication. How can such a transition be accom­
modated in a superselection account? Superselectionists propose to 
retain representation of time evolution by the action of a self-adjoint 
operator. That operator, according to the theory, will either achieve 
the required transition directly, or it will take advantage of the existence 
of superselection rules. Either way, I will argue, that operator must be 
such that it transgresses supersectors.
If the time evolution operator achieves representation of time tran­
sitions in indicator quantities directly, it must, obviously, fail to respect 
the invariance of supersectors, because its application to a given vector 
or projection operator in one supersector will (on the appropriate oc­
casions) result in a vector or operator in a different supersector. But 
consider now the case in which the time evolution operator achieves 
representation of time transitions in indicator quantities by taking ad­
vantage of superselection rules—as superselectionists anticipate it will. 
Application of the time evolution operator results in a superposition, Af  
or PA/for example, on the appropriate occasion (when A0 represents the 
initial state). Superselection rules, then, will ensure the replacement of 
this superposition with a mixture, W, which may be said to represent a 
state in which the indicator quantity takes on a different value than at 
the first. However since Af  does not lie in the same supersector as A0 
(because, in general, superpositions do not lie in the same subspaces as 
the superposed vectors), the time evolution operator must cross super­
sector boundaries. So, whether changes in indicator quantity are 
achieved directly or through superselection rules, the time evolution op­
erator of a superselection account must violate supersector boundaries.
Thus if there are to be alterations in the magnitudes of indicator 
quantities in particular, and if these quantities are to be represented by 
superselectors, the operator representing time transitions must be al­
lowed to transgress supersectors. And if so, it must be such as not to
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commute with all superselectors. And this fact, that the time evolution 
operator violates supersectors, is (to repeat for the sake of emphasis) 
due to precisely three conditions that a superselectionist approves:
1. Classical quantities shall be modeled by a subset of the super­
selectors.
2. Time evolution shall be generated by a self-adjoint operator.
3. Time evolution sometimes involves alterations in the magni­
tudes of classical quantities, of which indication quantities are 
a special species.
(1) is just the superselection policy currently on offer. (2) is that aspect 
of canonical quantum theory which superselectionists are determined 
to save. (3) is undeniable, and also part of the package (P1)-(P3) which 
superselectionists are determined to save; without (3) there is no (ap­
parent) conflict among (P1)-(P3), and hence no measurement problem 
to be solved.
The fact that the time evolution operator UT = cannot be an 
observable is therefore completely explained by (1)—(3), and nothing 
more needs to be said. And the same exactly holds also of the non­
observable status of the Hamiltonian H. It cannot help, therefore, to 
look to Dirac’s formulation of relativity, or the Gupta-Bleuler for­
mulation of QED, or ‘nonequilibrium processes’ or anything else, for 
an explanation of the nonobservable status of H  and UT. What could 
they add? For nothing is wanting in our explanation of the nonob­
servable status of H  and Uz.
Putting now to one side the meaning of H, what could UT, which 
also transgresses supersectors in superselection accounts of measure­
ment, signify? Superselectionists assume it is capable of representing 
(and generating) the advance in time, just as it does normally. But could 
it? Superselection is founded on the principle that the action of an 
operator transgressing supersector boundaries cannot represent a 
change of magnitude in a measurable quantity. Justification of this 
principle rests on the proposition that the action of superselectors pre­
serves the magnitudes of all measurable quantities (since it commutes 
with the operators representing them). The principle that a change of 
supersectors does not, as such, represent a change in a physical quan­
tity, is therefore a cornerstone of any theory that calls on super selection 
rules. It can also be construed as resting on incontestable principles of 
modeling directed at prohibiting illegitimate use of excess model struc­
ture. This principle prohibits us representing true physical changes via 
an operator that does not commute with all superselectors. I shall refer 
to this prohibition as the Excess Structure Principle (ESP). What is 
the status of ESP? ESP, to emphasize, is presupposed in each and
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every account which names the name of superselection rules, because 
it is concerned with making certain that we always treat exactly alike 
those state representations which agree on all probability measure as­
signments to the measurable quantities we wish to treat. Another way 
to conceive of the special status of ESP is to see it as reflecting the 
notion that superselection rules are a gauge of excess model structure. 
Upon the very clear merits of ESP we have been prepared to entertain 
the superselectionist’s replacement proposals (swaps of problematic su­
perpositions with unproblematic mixtures like W).
Now, in a superselection account of measurement neither H  nor Ur 
commutes with all superselectors, since both (as we saw) must trans­
gress supersectors. Hence, the superselectionist must acknowledge that 
the action o f neither H  nor Vx may represent a change in a physical 
quantity.
Could Uz represent the advance of time, therefore, if it cannot rep­
resent an alteration in physical state? Of course it can, if advance in 
time does not produce a change in state. But this, exactly, is the trouble 
with the superselection account. For it is in especially in those instances 
in which UT transgresses supersectors that superselectionists would like 
to acknowledge a change of magnitude in a physical quantity—specif­
ically, a change in the indicator quantity. Thus superselectionists aspire 
to violate a cornerstone of their own theory. If the cornerstone is re­
moved, how shall the swaps, which allow superselectionists to proclaim 
that certain superpositions have evolved by the Schrodinger equation 
into mixtures, be justified?
My complaint of superselection theories is therefore this: that they 
are committed to both of the following two propositions: (i) that Uz 
must, as a result of the incontestable ESP, commute with all superse­
lectors, since it must sometimes represent transformations in physical 
state; and also to (ii) that Uz cannot commute with all superselectors, 
since its action must be capable of bringing about supersector bound­
ary transgressions (and to do so by conforming to 1-3 above). This is 
a contradiction.
Hence if, on the urgings of superselectionists, we are prepared to 
adopt ESP, the principle that the action of an operator transgressing 
supersectors cannot signify alteration in some physical quantity—a 
concession that may itself be made without peril of contradiction—we 
cannot also be prepared to regard an operator that transgresses super­
sectors as responsible for representing straightforward alterations in 
indicator states. We can accept a superselection account of measure­
ment, therefore, only to the extent that we are prepared to acknowledge 
that, for our purposes, the initial and final states in a measurement 
process are one and the same physical state. But superselectionists
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would be the last to urge that we accept such a thing. We must therefore 
reject superselection as a means of accommodating the phenomena of 
measurement.
The utilization of superselection rules is legitimate only if, in toler­
ating the redundancies which exist when more than one element of the 
complicated mathematical model can represent the same system or sit­
uation, in relation to the interests identified by the theory framers, those 
theory framers can nonetheless forbid transitions in time out of super­
sectors and localize physical processes within supersectors. This pro­
hibition is routine in treatments of protons and neutrons as “nucle­
ons.”17 In these treatments a supersector-local description of behavior 
over time is prescribed and produced. Likewise we have no need for 
permitting a system with rotational angular momentum to evolve 
across supersector boundaries of the operator It should be a
requirement of superselection treatments that they prohibit transfor­
mations across supersector boundaries. Therefore in a treatment of 
quantum measurement, in which we wish to accommodate the fact that 
our measuring devices make transitions to and from their various in­
dicator states over time, it is entirely inappropriate to represent those 
states as eigenstates of a superselector.
The superselectionist’s mistake, put in its best light, is to suppose it 
possible to represent familiar macroscopic quantities that enter into 
interactions with the nonclassical systems treated so successfully by 
quantum mechanics, and suffer alterations in the process, as quantities 
for which we shall have no need of special treatment, either because 
they fall conveniently under a concept we already have in ordinary 
quantum mechanics, or because they require no treatment at all. The 
superselection proposal is simply to handle such quantities simply in 
the legend of a quantum-mechanical model. But the relations between 
these special macroquantities on the one hand, and those microquant­
ities treated so beautifully by quantum theory on the other, must be 
very complex, as well as very interesting, and do not deserve relegation 
to the ignominious existence of a mere inscription in the legend of a 
model—even if such treatment could be given without contradiction— 
however simple, convenient or in some other way irresistible a super­
selection treatment might otherwise prove to be.
7. The Special Case of Infinite Systems. It might be objected that the 
prohibition I am sponsoring, which disallows time transformations
17. And, as an anonymous referee pointed out, this is true also o f identical particles: 
vve cannot begin with bosons in some pure state and end with a mixture o f bosons and 
fermions.
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across supersector boundaries, is not acceptable in treatments of sys­
tems with infinite numbers of degrees of freedom, such as for example 
the class of systems for which Bub’s solution to the measurement prob­
lem are designed. (Bub thinks of these infinite systems as an ideal or 
limiting case, and proposes that we think of ordinary macrosystems as 
approximating infinite systems.) For, unlike systems with finite num­
bers of degrees of freedom, which are such that all the irreducible Hil­
bert space representations of their observables are unitarily equivalent, 
systems with infinite numbers of degrees of freedom enjoy many ine­
quivalent irreducible representations of their algebras of observables. 
And these, as the objection continues, can legitimately be utilized to 
represent different classical or macroscopic states, because there are 
objective grounds for discriminating among the inequivalent represen­
tations for purposes of representing different macroscopic or classical 
states. (Bub [9], for example, presents a treatment of spin density in an 
infinite 1-dimensional array of spin-'A systems which takes different 
values for microstates in different supersectors.) In the instance of in­
finite degrees of freedom there are, in other words, grounds for taking 
different irreducible representations to represent different states be­
cause these representations, according to the objection, are not simply 
copies of each other. Thus ESP does not apply. And so no contradic­
tions like that above can be deduced.
In reply it bears pointing out, first of all, that the fact that a certain 
pair of representations of operator algebras are not unitarily equivalent 
does not, as such, determine that these representations are not equally 
suited to representing the same quantities or states in exactly the same 
ways. The question whether they are so suited turns on whether the 
differences that exist among these representations are differences which 
may portray true physical differences among true physical systems, and 
this question is beyond the scope of the present discussion. So for pres­
ent purposes let us simply grant the assumption that the infinitist’s 
operator sets have different representational powers. Let us also grant 
the assumption that, in an infinitist treatment of measurement phe­
nomena, each member of the set of operators identified as classical or 
macroscopic can always be defined so as to commute with all operators, 
with the important exception of the so-called interaction Hamiltonian, 
which serves the purpose of producing transgressions of supersector 
boundaries in the infinitist treatment. Can we accommodate the facts 
of measurement in the infinitist’s superselection model, without con­
tradiction? Not if we insist on its truly being a superselection account.
The infinitist is, to be sure, rejecting the proposition that we are 
dealing with Hilbert spaces that have excess structure. But does this, if 
true, render the infinitist account immune to the prohibition I am spon­
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soring? Not entirely. ESP prohibits us from representing true physical 
changes by means of the action of an operator that transgresses su­
persector boundaries. Any treatment which observes the (superselec­
tionist) policy of handling alterations in time by an operator that vio­
lates a set of supersectors, automatically violates ESP. Thus infinitists 
who adheres to (1)—(3), remaining loyal to the superselection approach 
to measurement, do not escape the criticism to the effect that these 
accounts are a breeding ground for contradictions.
Infinitists might simply reply that, since the Hilbert spaces by means 
of which they propose to represent classical or macroscopic states are 
not simply copies of each other, these spaces cannot, officially speak­
ing, be termed ‘supersectors’. (They might say that we in fact know 
this is the case because the operators representing classical quantities 
in their account do not commute with the interaction Hamiltonian, as 
I myself have pointed out. And so these operators must not be super­
selectors, officially speaking.) And since the eigenspaces of an infini- 
tist’s treatment are not, strictly speaking, supersectors, there is no vi­
olation of ESP when the interaction Hamiltonian transgresses sector 
boundaries. So there is no contradiction.
To be sure, infinitists who take this route will escape violating ESP. 
However they will at the same time cease to possess suitable qualifi­
cations as superselectionists, as they will not be availing themselves of 
superselection rules. (For an infinitist who takes this route out of the 
difficulty is claiming that the superselection portion of his or her ac­
count is disposable, and not core to the proposal on offer.) And such 
an infinitist will have lost an important ingredient of the original the­
ory, namely the original grounds (spelled out above) for replacing cer­
tain superpositions with mixtures. For these replacements are predi­
cated on the fact that there is excess structure in the models being 
pressed into service. The replacements depend, in other words, on the 
fact that certain superpositions, in the model being employed, do not 
represent physical states different from the states superposed (because 
commutation relations hold between operators representing physical 
magnitudes and a superselector), but do represent something because 
we make the decision to allow more than one mathematical object to 
represent the same physical situation. This is a heavy loss indeed, for 
now the infinitist faces the very large task of developing a new proposal 
for replacing superpositions with mixtures.
The infinitist might say that the superpositions which need replacing 
are meaningless—for example, a superposition of spin density states 
“predominantly-up” and “predominantly-down” is meaningless. And 
so infinitists are entitled to replace them with mixtures on the very same 
grounds that superselectionists are entitled to make their replace­
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ments—namely, that there is some excess structure. Nevertheless the 
infinitist may admit that there is not as much excess structure in the 
model being proposed as in the models superselection theorists typi­
cally have on their hands. This seems a promising approach. But the 
claim that there is some excess structure in the model of infinite systems, 
does not automatically entitle the infinitist to replace superpositions 
with mixtures. Entitlement to these replacements comes with being able 
to demonstrate that the mixture sought and the superposition it is re­
placing agree on probability assignments to all the prospects associated 
with the algebra of measurable quantities. This agreement can be dem­
onstrated, as is done in noninfinite superselection accounts, on the as­
sumption that all operators representing measurable quantities are re­
duced by certain of the model’s subspaces, which fact qualifies these 
subspaces as supersectors. But the infinitist has just given up the right 
to this assumption, because (if the infinitist reply presented in the pre­
ceding paragraph is correct) there are no true supersectors in the infin- 
itist’s model. Perhaps the infinitist can make a case for replacements, 
but we should like to see that case made.
In conclusion, while the original, noninfinitist, superselection theo­
ries of measurements suffer from being contradictory, infinitist theories 
whose superselection components are either disposable or disposed of, 
suffer from being misnamed. What is worse, they suffer from lacking 
grounds for making the swaps they wish to make—swaps of super­
positions for mixtures—for which a superselection proposal was pre­
sumably adopted in the first place. To be sure the infinitist has room 
for maneuver: he or she may offer alternative grounds for replacing 
superpositions with mixtures, possibly superselection-like, possibly 
resting on (yet undisclosed) facts about inequivalent irreducible rep­
resentations. But even if the infinitist can pull this off this sizable feat, 
the result will not be—strictly speaking—a superselection account.
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